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Damages in Private Antitrust Actions
in Europe
Jonathan Sinclair*

I. Introduction
The private enforcement of antitrust remedies through civil
action in federal and state courts is vital to the detection and
deterrence of antitrust violations in the United States. U.S. filings of
antitrust claims total around 600 to 1000 a year, of which private
claims account for roughly 90%. By contrast, in the European Union
("E.U."), there are virtually no cases in which damages have been
awarded for breach of the key E.U. competition provisions Article 81
(which prohibits anti-competitive agreements) and Article 82 (which
prohibits abuses of a dominant market position). Recent
developments in the E.U., however, are now providing an impetus for
change.
The E.U. has already followed the U.S. example in relation to
increased regulatory enforcement and rapidly escalating fines. In
November 2001, the European Commission imposed fines totaling
$775 million on members of the vitamin cartel, in addition to those
already imposed in the U.S. In March 2001, the Office of Fair
Trading ("OFT") in the U.K. issued its first fine for an infringement
of the Competition Act 1998 against Napp Pharmaceutical, a
subsidiary of the U.S. Perdue Pharma Group. Napp was ordered to
pay £3.2 million for abuse of a dominant position in the market for
slow release morphine. This figure was based on a formula that
allows a maximum fine of 10% of U.K. turnover. Although the fine
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was reduced to £2.2 million on appeal in January 2002, Napp remains
subject to controls on pricing in relation to future sales.
Over the last 12 months, the OFT and the European
Commission have been very active in conducting dawn raids and
investigations in relation to suspected cartels. This will likely lead to
further fines. Now, private damage claims are set to become an
integral part of the antitrust landscape in the E.U. and its member
states.
The detail of how the award of private damages will be
approached within the E.U. and at the national level within the
member states is at this stage, to a significant degree, an open
question. This can only be answered as claims are pursued through
national and European courts. However, this is an opportune time to
compare the long established experience in the U.S., with the
approach that is likely to be taken in such cases on the basis of
existing principles on damages in the E.U. There are many key
differences between the U.S. and E.U. approach, many of which are
likely to remain despite the increasing convergence of antitrust
regulation and practice between the U.S. and E.U. generally. This
paper provides a background to the E.U. position and highlights some
of the key differences of antitrust regulation and practice between the
U.S. and E.U.

II. Background
The Treaty of Rome, now known as the E.C. Treaty, the
cornerstone of the E.U., envisioned that antitrust or "competition"
law would primarily be enforced by a centralized system through the
E.U. regulatory authorities. The current system places emphasis on
advance clearance through Brussels of potentially anti-competitive
agreements via notification procedures seeking the granting of
exemptions. It is now recognized, however, that this has led to levels
of congestion, which precludes effective progress. Thus, as part of its
"modernization policy," the E.U. Commission is seeking to both
divest itself of much of its enforcement activities to national
regulatory authorities and courts of member states, and to encourage
an increasingly litigation-based approach.
In order for the "modernization policy" to be effective, the
national courts of member states need to adopt a unified approach
governing both procedural issues and private damage awards. This is
because all E.U. member states have an obligation to recognize the
supremacy of E.U. law. However, there is no statutory provision in
E.U. law equivalent to the U.S. federal antitrust law in Section 4 of
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the Clayton Act. Therefore, until E.U. legislation and E.U. case law
develops, the basis on which private damages are claimed through
national courts will depend upon the relevant principles of national
law, provided that these principles give an effective remedy to
claimants injured by breaches of Article 81 or 82.
Currently, national law governs not only the measure of
damages claimed, but also the underlying legal basis of entitlement to
damages. For example, England's House of Lords, in Garden
Cottage Foods v. Milk Marketing Board, held that a breach of Article
82 (then Article 86) would give rise, in principle, to a remedy in
damages. 1 In Garden Cottage Foods, however, because an injunction
was granted to compel the Milk Marketing Board to resume
supplying milk, damages were not awarded. Following this case, it
was thought that the basis for any damage claim under English law
would be characterized as resulting from a breach of statutory duty.
However, academic debate continues as to whether, for example, the
economic torts of unlawful interference with business relations or
conspiracy provides a preferable approach. This is because the test
for causation of damages for a breach of statutory duty is a relatively
unsophisticated factual one, which could give rise to a liability
for an
2
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class of claimants.
Over the last 20 years, many cases have been decided in the
U.K., E.U. member states, and in the European Courts confirming the
availability of private actions for damages without giving rise to
concrete examples of damages awards (with only one exception, so
far as I am aware, in the Netherlands). A key decision was
Francovich v. Italian Republic.3 This case demonstrated the
determination of the European Court of Justice to ensure that the
effectiveness of E.U. law was upheld by means of civil remedies
through the national courts. 4 Francovich, however, did not deal with
any breach of antitrust laws. At issue was whether Italian employees
of an insolvent company could bring a private damages claim as a
result of the Italian Government's failure to implement a Commission
Directive that would enable the employees to recover substantial

' [1984] AC 130, 141.
2 Mark Hoskins, Garden Cottage Revisited: The Availability of Damages in
the National Courts for Breaches of the EEC Competition Rules, EUR.
COMPETION L. REv. 1992, 13(6), 257-265, 260.
3 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R.

1-5357 (E.C.J.).
4 Id.
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arrears of salary.
While there have been many instances across the E.U. of
interim relief granted to private defendants for competition law
breaches, the availability of damages has continued to be a matter for
theoretical debate rather than practical application. A change in
approach within the E.U. is, however, clearly evident in recent
Commission proposals. 5 This change is reflected in legislation now
proposed within individual member states. For example, the U.K.
Government recently published its Enterprise White Paper on
Competition, which is likely to find its way onto the statute books by
autumn 2002. 6 The new White Paper contains critical changes
updating the national regime set out under the Competition Act 1998,
which made no express reference to private claims for damages. For
instance, the new White Paper contains a full section setting out
proposals on how private claims for damages are to be encouraged.
This includes procedural changes allowing compensation awards by
the Competition Commission Appeal Tribunals. Moreover, it
encourages the pursuit of such claims in civil courts. Another
important development is the introduction of antitrust criminal
offenses in the U.K. The paper suggests that certain consumer
organizations will be given an officially recognized representative
status to bring claims for compensation and damages on behalf of
consumers who may, for example, be victims of cartels.
Similar developments are taking place in other member states
across the E.U., with the result that the floodgates for civil damage
claims are now potentially opening. Both the courts of member states
and of the European Union will be heavily influenced by the U.S.
experience in relation to such claims. However, unless new
legislation and case law at the E.U. level imposes a radically different
approach, certain important distinctions from the American model
will remain.

5 See A facelift for EC Competition, GC, 2000, V(10), 37, available at
http://www.practicallaw.com/scripts/article.asp?ArticleID= 16270 (last visited
Feb. 17, 2002); see also Reforming EC Competition Rules: The End of
Notification?, PLC, 2001, XII(2), 23, available at http://www.practicallaw.com/

scripts/article.asp?ArticleID=17215

(last visited Feb.

17, 2002); see also

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2002).
6 A World Class Competition Regime, available at http://www.dti.gov.uk./
cp/whitepaper/523302.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
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III. Key Issues
This section highlights important distinctions in antitrust laws
between the American and European models.
A. Treble damages
As noted above, there is no provision in E.U. law, or the laws
of member states, equivalent to Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Ironically though, Section 4 of the Clayton Act has its roots in the
treble damage provision contained in the obsolete English Statute of
Monopolies of 1623. The prospect of treble damages under the
Clayton Act provides a greater incentive for claims than currently
exists in the E.U. Treble damages provide the claimant the possibility
of a windfall over and above compensation for their actual loss. The
principle of treble damages, however, is at odds with the damage
principles applied in the E.U. and the national courts of most member
states. Rather, civil damages serve as a matter for criminal sanctions
through fines and other penalties versus serving as a public policy
deterrent. Therefore, due to the increasing regularity and size of fines
by the regulatory bodies at the national level, as well at the E.U.
level, there is no likelihood that the statutory treble damages
approach will be followed in the E.U.
B. Exemplary Damages
It has been suggested that a viable alternative approach to
treble damages in the E.U. can be accomplished by a separate and
additional grant of punitive or "exemplary" damages. Although
punitive damages are far more widely available in the U.S. than in
England and other E.U. countries, I understand they cannot be
awarded in the U.S. in addition to the statutory treble damages
measure.
The instances in which exemplary damages are available in
the U.K., however, are extremely limited, and very rarely made
available.7 A recognized category applied in antitrust cases arises
where wrongful conduct by a defendant is calculated to make a profit
exceeding the likely compensation payable to the injured claimant.
For example, the establishment of a cartel based on the calculated
risk that the illegal profits generated will exceed any damage award

Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.); Cassell & Co. v. Broome,
[1972] A.C. 1027 (H.L.); A.B. v. S.W. Water Servs. Ltd., [1993] Q.B. 507.
7

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 14: 547

resulting from the discovery of the cartel.
The Law Commission has recommended that exemplary
damages should be more widely available, particularly in relation to
breaches of statutory duty. 8 Antitrust cases, wherein the conduct of
the defendant clearly merits the strongest disapproval, may prompt
further development in this respect, either through legislation or case
law. In contrast to punitive damages in the U.S., however, a judge,
rather than a jury, would award exemplary damages, and the level of
damages enhancement, therefore, is unlikely to reach U.S.
proportions.
C. Measure of Loss
As already indicated, the national courts of each member state
will potentially approach the problems inherent in establishing the
measure of loss for the purpose of calculating damages differently, at
least until a substantive body of E.U. case law is developed to
provide them with clear guiding principles. On the basis that breaches
are characterized as torts, in particular breaches of statutory duty, the
starting point for any claim will be to determine the measure of
damages required to restore the claimant to the position it would have
been in if the defendant had not breached its duty. Therefore, a
claimant seeking damages from a member of a cartel for breach of
Article 81 would be entitled to claim the difference between the price
actually paid for the relevant goods or services, and the price that
would have been paid in a competitive market.
The burden of proving loss by a claimant, certainly in the
U.K., is heavy and discharging. It is likely to be the major hurdle in
pursuing a claim, particularly where liability is not an issue because
of a previous finding of infringement of competition law by the
regulatory authorities. In the U.S., a less restrictive approach is taken
to the assessment of damages. The U.S. Supreme Court will allow
jury verdicts to stand where they represent "a just and reasonable
estimate of the damage based on relevant data," 9 provided that the
loss resulting from anti-competitive
acts is distinguished from injury
0
competition.'
lawful
to
due
8 See The Law Commission: Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary
Damages, available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lc247/contents.htm (last

visited Feb. 17, 2002).
9 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
10 MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1161

(7th Cir. 1983).
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D. Types of Damages
The types of damages most commonly recognized in U.S.
cases - overcharges and enhanced price damages, lost profit,
diminished revenue damages, and damages for the terminated
business - are logical classifications that must, in practice, be traced
back to the facts of each case. In principle, all of these types of losses
are also recoverable in E.U. antitrust cases. In Factortame III, the
European Court of Justice was asked to consider whether E.U. law
required national courts (Germany in this case) to award damages and
interest under a number of damage types, including various
categories of expense, lost profit and exemplary damages. 1 The court
confirmed that E.U. law imposed "no specific criteria," provided that
national remedies did not discriminate and were adequate. As a
matter of common sense, lost profit must be recoverable if effective
compensation is to be achieved in antitrust cases.
E. Approach to Quantification
The methodologies applied in U.S. cases to assess such losses
are also likely to be recognized by the E.U. to provide useful methods
of approaching the question of quantification. For example, in the
case of overcharge damages, depending on the particular facts of the
case and the nature of the infringement, an E.U. claimant may utilize
the "pre-post" approach, the "yard-stick" measure, or a variety of
other economic models and cost measurement. As in the U.S., an
E.U. claimant has the flexibility in deciding what approach to adopt
in making out their case. However, a defendant can counter with a
number of different alternatives if the claimant's chosen method of
quantifying loss places the measure of loss alleged in a completely
different light.
If civil claims are to be effectively encouraged in the E.U.,
there needs to be a degree of relaxation in the approach by the courts
of at least some E.U. member states, including the U.K. - for
example, the rigor of the burden imposed on a claimant in a claim
based on anticipated profits. Again, the U.S. provides a useful lead
that is not inconsistent with E.U. laws. The U.S. places a stricter
requirement on the need to show the fact of damage, rather than
establishing the amount of damages. Moreover, U.S. courts tend to
try and find a way in which damages can be awarded once it has been

"i Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Factortame III, [1996] Q.B. 404
(E.C.J.).
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determined that a wrong has been done.
F. Passing On
A key area where there is likely to be a distinction between
the ability to claim damages in the E.U. and in the U.S. is in the
approach of passing on overcharges by the claimant to a subsequent
purchaser. Although mitigated to some extent by state legislation, the
Supreme Court's approach in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois established
the basic rule that indirect purchasers are denied the right to claim
damages. 12 This rule, however, is contrary to E.U. law and to the law
of most E.U. member states. As a result, indirect purchasers able to
prove injury will be free to pursue their claims in the E.U. However,
the resulting complexities of establishing causation of loss and
determining at what level in the supply chain it has been incurred, is
likely to be substantial. As recognized in Illinois Brick, this will add
to the difficulties of proving loss for both the immediate customer
and remote purchasers if overlapping compensation claims are to be
avoided.
This leads to the question of what approach will be taken in
the E.U. with regard to the U.S. rule established in Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. The Court in Hanover Shoe
precluded a defendant from using evidence of the passing on of
losses as a defense to a damages claim brought by a direct
purchaser. 13 The U.S. example, creating a legal presumption that the
direct purchaser incurs the full loss, is contrary to the approach
generally taken in the U.K. and other E.U. jurisdictions. To follow
Hanover Shoe, yet allow indirect purchasers to pursue claims, would
give rise to the possibility of what would be characterized in the E.U.
as "unjust enrichment," since double counting and overlapping of
claims would result. This approach would also place an additional,
and arguably unfair, burden on the defendant, which in some cases
may cause insolvency. It has, however, been forcibly argued that the
effectiveness and objectives of E.U. antitrust law are more likely to
be achieved if the wrongdoer is required to pay the full amount of
any overcharge to the direct purchaser, as well as bearing the risk of
claims from any more remote customers who are able to prove their
lOSS. 14 Any unfairness to the defendant would arguably be less

12

431 U.S. 720 (1977).

13

392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).

14

CLIFFORD A. JONES, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTiTRUST LAW IN THE
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extreme than in the U.S. since any damage overlap would not amount
to treble damages. Although it seems likely that it will not be long
before this issue is tested in an E.U. court, the outcome is, at present,
a matter of speculation.
G. Pre-judgment Interest
The award of pre-judgment interest is generally precluded in
the U.S. However, under E.U. law, and that of most other E.U.
jurisdictions, it is common to award interest at a commercial rate
from the date when the damage first began. In many cases where
anti-competitive conduct may have taken place over a period of many
years, the award of pre-judgment interest potentially represents a very
significant addition to a damages claim itself. Therefore, the interest
will go at least part of the way to bringing total potential claims in the
E.U. more in line with the level of damages available in the U.S.
through the operation of the treble damages rule.
H. Rights to Contribution
As in the U.S., defendants in the E.U. will generally be jointly
and severally liable for damages resulting from concerted unlawful
conduct - for example, operating a cartel. A defendant in such
circumstances, in accordance with general principles, would seek a
contribution from any other defendants if found liable for damages.
The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in relation to price
fixing cases, where it has been held that a party liable for damages
cannot seek such a contribution, 15 has no parallel in the E.U. at
present. The U.S. rule may be seen as unfair to cartel members with a
lesser degree of responsibility or who are less able to sustain the costs
of defending a claim. However, the perceived advantage of increased
pressure for early settlement will, to this extent, also not apply in any
E.U. action. This may result in a greater incentive for an E.U.
claimant to join all potential defendants, rather than concentrate their
fire on one.
I. Participation in the Infringement
Until very recently, it was thought that an E.U. claimant that
had itself been party to an illegal agreement or arrangement might be

Eu, UK

AND

15 Tex.

USA 193-98 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).

Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S 630, 646 (1981).
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precluded from pursuing a claim. This is in contrast to the basic rule
in the U.S. However, the recent European Court of Justice decision in
Courage v. Crehan confirmed that this would not give rise to an
absolute bar. 16 The case also recognized that an appropriate
proportion might reduce the damages recoverable by such a claimant
in order to reflect the degree of their own involvement, since a full
recovery in these circumstances represents an unjust enrichment. This
was particularly relevant in Crehan. In this case, Bernard Crehan, the
claimant, was one of a large number of tenant publicans upon whom
a new lease was imposed as a result of the merger of the catering and
beer businesses of Grand Metropolitan and Courage. One of the
terms of the standard tenancy required publicans to purchase all beer
exclusively from Courage. In an instance like this, the degree of
culpability on the part of Mr. Crehan, in originally signing the
tenancy, was arguably negligible in view of the discrepancy in
bargaining power.
Furthermore, the English Court of Appeals has addressed
similar issues to the Crehan case with similar results. The court was
clearly influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., which addressed
similar issues to the Crehan case with similar results. 17 In Perma, Mr.
Justice White, in a concurring opinion, stated that he would only
deny recovery to a plaintiff who was himself in breach of unlawful
agreements if he
bore "substantially equal responsibility" to that of
8
the defendant.'
J. Off Setting Benefits and Mitigation
As in the U.S., where a claimant has received a benefit as well
as incurring a detriment as a result of an antitrust infringement, the
general approach in the E.U. is that both the benefit and detriment
must be taken into account. This principle applies not only in cases
where (as in Crehan and Perma) the claimant has received part of the
benefit of an illegal arrangement in which he himself participated, but
also to those where the claimant is purely a victim. The duty to
mitigate losses in the E.U. is likely to be approached in a similar way
as in the U.S., in that the defendant would need to establish that the
claimant's conduct was unreasonable if the claim is to be reduced, or

16 Case

C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, [2001] C.M.L.R. 28 (E.C.J.).

7 392 U.S. 134, 146 (1968).
18 id.
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negated altogether, on this ground.
K. Costs
The Clayton Act specifically allows a successful plaintiff to
recover the cost of suit, including reasonable attorney's fee. Recovery
of costs by the winner is the general principle in the U.K. in any
event. However, the level of costs awarded is likely to be very much
less in the E.U., where contingent fees on the U.S. model are not
available, and class actions are far less common.

IV. Summary
In view of the substantial history of antitrust damage claims in
the U.S., it may seem surprising that private claimants in the E.U.
have been slow to follow their lead. This has, at least partly, been a
result of the way in which national and E.U. law, and their
enforcement systems, have interrelated. Recent developments
confirm, however, that this is about to change rapidly. As the
European Commission frees itself to focus increasingly on the
investigation of cartel cases, resale price maintenance, and serious
instances of abuse of dominance, the national courts of the E.U.
member states are likely to see a marked rise in private claims.
Presently, there is a new awareness among U.K. businesses of
the ability to use antitrust law to obtain practical remedies, rather than
to simply view antitrust law from the perspective of compliance. U.S.
and multinational businesses operating in the E.U. will need to be
aware of the resulting risks, and also the key differences between the
damages regimes. These differences are likely to be of interest to
potential claimants as they indulge in forum shopping to enhance the
prospects and the size of any damage awards.

